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The foundations for the safety regulation of healthcare are twofold: state 
medical practice acts and the federal laws that require the approval and 
surveillance of drugs and devices. The former have been with us for well over a 
century,1 the latter for eighty years in the case of drugs2 and almost fifty years for 
devices.3 The key concept in the practice acts is the “practice of medicine.” In 
device regulation, it is the functional definition of “device” contained in the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act).4 Over time, these 
foundational regulatory precepts have been joined by a patchwork of additional 
provisions goaled with the regulation of particular entities, such as hospitals5, or 
specific activities, such as data protection6 and research involving human subjects.7 
This Article argues that advances in healthcare artificial intelligence (AI) will 
seriously challenge the robustness and appropriateness of our current healthcare 
regulatory models. Initially and as detailed in Part III, healthcare AI will join other 
technologies such as big data and mobile health apps in highlighting current 
deficiencies in healthcare regulatory models, particularly in data protection. In 
particular, healthcare AI will challenge regulatory models that use binary 
formulations such as “safe” or “unsafe.” As a result, and detailed in Part IV, the 
regulation of AI will require some fresh thinking: future AI regulation should be 
underpinned by broadly embraced ethical and moral values, and must be holistic, 
universal, contextually aware, and responsive to what will be major shifts in the 
man-machine relationship. 
This Article proceeds in four parts and provides a comprehensive examination 
of current and future healthcare AI regulation. Part II provides context by 
suggesting a typology for healthcare AI technologies. In large part, the ordering of 
these types of healthcare AI is based on when their substitutive effects will be felt, 
identifying from first to last healthcare functions or tasks that will experience 
                                               
 1. See generally Clinton Sandvick, Enforcing Medical Licensing in Illinois: 1877-1890, 82 YALE J. 
BIOLOGY MED. 67, 67 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2701151/. For the definition of 
drug see 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2018). 
 2. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FDC) Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-747, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 3. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 4. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2018); see generally https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/ucm300639.htm 
 5. See, e.g., Illinois Hospital Licensing Act, 210 Ill. Comp. Stat. 85/. 
 6. See, e.g., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, HIPAA Basics for Providers: Privacy, Security, 
and Breach Notification Rules (Sept. 2018), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-
Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/HIPAAPrivacyandSecurityTextOnly.pdf. 
 7. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2018). 
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augmentation or replacement by AI. Part III is a critical examination of the existing 
healthcare regulatory structure as it would be applied to AI. It sketches out the 
public and private ordering systems (device regulation, licensure, privacy and 
confidentiality, reimbursement, market forces, and litigation) that apply today and 
identifies their weaknesses in regulating healthcare AI. Part IV then suggests the 
imperatives for a new regulatory structure, one that relies less on the sense that we 
know the “practice of medicine” or “device” when we see it. There are some 
specific challenges here. The foremost is that future regulation should be built on 
top of some generally accepted normative principles. However, many of these 
normative principles are either in their infancy or lack universality, being 
illustrative of diverse cultural approaches to the provision of healthcare. 
Notwithstanding, some broad regulatory imperatives are suggested; from fairly 
obvious baselines such as quality, safety, and efficacy and a modern data 
protection construct to more nuanced requirements such as cost-effectiveness, 
empathy, health equity, and transparency. 
By necessity, this article discusses a broad swathe of technologies and their 
implementation. Some of the discussions involve AI, others AI that employs 
machine learning (ML) or neural networks, and others robots that are AI and data-
driven. The underlying technology is AI, and whether a particular discussion 
involves healthcare AI, robots, or ML will be a function of how the AI finds 
physical expression.8 Therefore, to reduce repeated compound references (e.g., AI 
and robots) the term AI (or healthcare AI) is used as a comprehensive label for the 
technologies relying on context or more specific labelling where that is necessary. 
The underlying assumptions of this article are that healthcare AI is advancing 
at a far greater pace than prior healthcare technology implementations and is 
outpacing any adaptation by extant regulatory models. The arguments moving 
forward are not merely for more or better regulation. Rather, they begin by 
suggesting the normative discussions that have to precede those regulatory steps 
and then sketch out the likely pillars for the future regulation of healthcare AI. 
II. DEFINITION, TYPOLOGY, AND SUBSTITUTION 
The interrelationship between data, data analytics, AI, ML, and robotics is 
complex. Diagnostic, predictive, and prescriptive analytics are often powered by 
AI; the most recent AI involves ML, with the machine being trained on massive 
datasets. Current technology underlying AI involves neural networks and special 
algorithms that are modelled on the human brain, often with the ability to adapt or 
teach themselves. Some AI finds expression in the physical world through humans. 
                                               
 8. Nicolas Terry, Appification, AI, and Healthcare’s New Iron Triangle, 20 J. HEALTH CARE LAW & 
POLICY, 117, 137 (2018).  
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Other forms find expression through machines that we call robots. 
The European Commission’s guidance on ethical AI included a useful 
working definition: 
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are software (and possibly also 
hardware) systems designed by humans that, given a complex 
goal, act in the physical or digital dimension by perceiving their 
environment through data acquisition, interpreting the collected 
structured or unstructured data, reasoning on the knowledge, or 
processing the information, derived from this data and deciding 
the best action(s) to take to achieve the given goal. AI systems can 
either use symbolic rules or learn a numeric model, and they can 
also adapt their behaviour by analysing how the environment is 
affected by their previous actions.9 
Of course, definitional labelling can have rhetorical effects. For example, AI 
is broadly understood to stand for Artificial Intelligence,10 but in its 2018 policy 
recommendations the American Medical Association (AMA) preferred the phrase 
“augmented intelligence.”11 In a supporting document, the AMA noted that, in 
health care, a more appropriate term is “augmented intelligence” (AI) because it 
reflects the enhanced capabilities of human clinical decision making when coupled 
with these computational methods and systems.”12 Of course, that labelling hides 
a conclusion; that the physician, not the AI, will have primacy. “Artificial 
intelligence” is also viewed by some as threatening, perhaps explaining why 
Google now just uses the acronym “AI.”13 
Our current healthcare AI also suffers from sorting errors because of 
inaccurate labelling. For example, today’s surgical “robots” use teleoperation 
technology that translates human interactions into minimally-invasive micro 
surgery; as such they are not worthy of an autonomy-suggesting label.14 
Descriptions of healthcare AI can also be under-inclusive, tending to concentrate 
on large AI projects such as IBM’s Watson Health, GE Healthcare’s Edison, or 
                                               
 9. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR TRUSTWORTHY AI 36 (2019) [hereinafter EU 
GUIDANCE ON AI]. 
 10. Robert L. Adams, 10 Powerful Examples of Artificial Intelligence in Use Today, FORBES (Jan. 10, 
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertadams/2017/01/10/10-powerful-examples-of-artificial-intelligence-
in-use-today. 
 11. Press Release, AMA, AMA Passes First Policy Recommendations on Augmented Intelligence (June 
14, 2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-release/ama-passes-first-policy-recommendations-
augmented-intelligence 
 12. Am. Med. Assoc., Augmented Intelligence in Health Care, 2018 at 2, https://www.ama-
assn.org/system/files/2019-01/augmented-intelligence-policy-report.pdf. 
 13. GOOGLE AI, https://ai.google. 
 14. See generally DA VINCI SURGERY, http://www.davincisurgery.com. 
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Google’s DeepMind at the expense of consumer-facing products such as apps and 
smart watches that increasingly contain AI, even neural networks. 
Discussions about AI can also be derailed by physical form. Perhaps not 
surprisingly given their conjectural role of substituting for humans, robots often 
are built in humanoid shapes. This tendency has been amplified by many of the 
literary and film iterations of robots that have adopted human-like form or have 
even been part man, part robot. Some depictions have been terrifying,15 others cute 
with important narrative roles.16 Others feed into the regulatory discussion, as 
writers have increasingly explored both dangerous and intimate interactions and 
interrelationships between man and machine.17 Humanoid form also increases the 
likelihood that the AI will have social valence, that humans will view some 
applications as more than mere objects. As Ryan Calo has argued, “to a greater 
degree than perhaps any technology in history, robots have a social valence to 
people.”18 
In cases where healthcare AI is given humanoid form, heightened regulation 
may be justified because of broad concerns caused by intimacy.19 Traditionally, 
our regulatory systems (primarily licensure and liability) have carefully regulated 
intimate relationships such as those between physician and patient because of 
concerns such as informational asymmetry and patient vulnerability. 
Overall, however, few healthcare robots are likely to be humanoid, rather, 
their shape(s) will follow their function20 Kevin Kelly makes a similar point about 
the cognitive nature of AI or robots: “To demand that artificial intelligence be 
humanlike is the same flawed logic as demanding that artificial flying be birdlike, 
with flapping wings. Robots will think different.” Thus, it is likely an error to use 
resemblance (or lack thereof) to familiar persons or objects as classification 
                                               
 15. Such as THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984) or MORGAN (20th Century Fox 2016). 
 16. Such as the droids in the STAR WARS series or Commander Data in Star trek the Next Generation. 
Brett White, 15 Best Star Wars Droids Ever, CBR (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.cbr.com/15-best-star-wars-droids-
ever; Data, STAR TREK http://www.startrek.com/database_article/data. 
 17. See, e.g., Megan Eisenfelder, Westworld: Are the Hosts Human?, GROUNDS (Jan. 3, 2017), 
http://www.vabioethics.com/content/2017/1/3/westworld-are-the-hosts-human; Humans: About the Show, AMC, 
http://www.amc.com/shows/humans/exclusives/about. See also https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/28/health/rise-of-
digisexuals-intl/index.html; https://www.wired.com/2017/10/hiroshi-ishiguro-when-robots-act-just-like-
humans. 
 18. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 513, 546 (2015). 
 19. Alex Mar, Love in the Time of Robots, WIRED (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.wired.com/
2017/10/hiroshi-ishiguro-when-robots-act-just-like-humans; Andrea Morris, Prediction: Sex Robots are the Most 
Disruptive Technology We Didn’t See Coming, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andreamorris/2018/09/25/prediction-sex-robots-are-the-most-disruptive-
technology-we-didnt-see-coming 
 20. See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Premarket Approval, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma.cfm?id=p080009; see generally Cade Metz, 
Inside Google’s Rebooted Robotics Program, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/technology/google-robotics-lab.html (discussing Google robotics and 
noting an increased integration of machine learning and less interest in humanoid form) 
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touchstones. 
The power of machine learning and the neural networks underlying it are 
frequently demonstrated by AI’s growing power to win complex games. While 
there is nothing particularly new in pursuing that endeavor, the most recent 
example, the AlphaZero algorithm, is of great importance both because it is 
essentially self-taught and can defeat computing AI systems programmed to win 
specific games.21 This suggests that neural networks are evolving in ways that not 
only mimic but also exceed the human brain.22 
An open question is when we will reach (or recognize) the tipping point of 
healthcare AI implementation. A somewhat skeptical view is justified because 
healthcare has exhibited a dismal record for adopting cutting edge technologies.23 
After all, by one estimate seventy-five percent of all medical communications still 
rely on facsimile machines.24 Expressed differently, “[p]atients haven’t always 
benefited from the promises of technology . . . [and] [t]echnology companies have 
given patients few reasons to trust them with all their medical data.”25 
Notwithstanding, AI has already insinuated itself into many aspects of healthcare 
delivery, medicine, and research. Examples include everything from custodial 
tugs, mobile health apps and wearables, and analytics packages designed to reduce 
readmissions. However, AI’s first major impact, that “gotcha moment,” will be 
when its predictive abilities begin to dominate the space. Today, the practice of 
medicine is dominated by heuristics and rule-based systems. The former, while 
efficient in that they quickly access already cached data and (apparently) similar 
decisions, are prone to cognitive biases.26 While AI has its own bias issues 
(including the cognitive biases of programmers and skewed data sets used for 
training), it should comfortably outperform heuristics and with fewer errors.27 The 
latter rule-based systems (for example, if-then rules in clinical practice guidelines) 
are typically derived from comparisons of inputs and outputs; for example, in the 
event of state A, use treatment Y, but don’t use treatment Z in the event of state B. 
In the first case, any false positives (bad outcomes from using Y) are outnumbered 
                                               
 21. David Silver et al, A General Reinforcement Learning Algorithm That Masters Chess, Shogi, and Go 
Through Self-play, 362 SCIENCE 1140, 1140-44 (2018). See also David Silver et al, Mastering the Game of Go 
Without Human Knowledge, 550 NATURE 354, 354-59 (2017). 
 22. James Kirkpatrick et al., Overcoming Catastrophic Forgetting in Neural Networks, 114 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 3521, 3521 (2017). 
 23. Nicolas Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Healthcare, 13 Nev. L.J. 722 (2013) 
 24. Sara Kliff, The Fax of Life, VOX (Jan 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/health-care/2017/10/30/
16228054/american-medical-system-fax-machines-why. 
 25. Michael Mittelman, Sarah Markham & Mark Taylor. Patient Commentary: Stop Hyping Artificial 
Intelligence—Patients Will Always Need Human Doctors, 363 BMJ k4669 (2018). 
 26. See generally The Joint Commission, Cognitive Biases in Health Care (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/23/Quick_Safety_Issue_28_Oct_2016.pdf 
 27. Jim Guszcza & Nikhil Maddirala, Minds and Machines, 19 DELOITTE REV. 7 (2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/deloitte-review/issue-19/art-of-forecasting-human-in-the-loop-
machine-learning.html (“Unaided judgment is an unreliable guide to action”) 
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by the good outcomes. In the second case, there are too many bad outcomes to 
outnumber any false negatives (persons with Z who could benefit from B). Once 
these issues are understood as prediction problems, properly trained AI can be used 
to make far better determinations about populations that will benefit from Y and Z 
decisions that are not frozen by rules and, as more decisions are made, continually 
improve.28 
In an attempt to construct a timeline for, or manage apprehension about, AI, a 
great deal of reliance has been placed on substitution: a metric that attempts to 
predict the likelihood of a particular human endeavor or economic activity being 
supplemented or replaced by AI. By that measure, healthcare professionals have 
relatively low potential for substitution.29 Indeed, a White House AI study reported 
that while “AI technology . . . may improve early detection of some cancers or 
other illnesses,” it will nevertheless take a human “to work with patients to 
understand and translate patients’ symptoms, inform patients of treatment options, 
and guide patients through treatment plans.”30 As emphasized below the value of 
the substitution metric must not be overstated. Further, some healthcare AI 
implementations may jump ahead, resorting the substitution list such that, for 
example, an apparently “safe” medical subspecialty is replaced by AI. 
A. Typology 
Although the substitution metric must be used cautiously, the likelihood of 
substitution provides one method of typing current or near-term healthcare AI, 
both as to function and sorting by ascending likelihood of mass adoption. Needless 
to say, the categories discussed below will exhibit considerable overlap. 
Administrative. 
There is urgent need to substitute out current healthcare administrative 
practices and technologies. According to CMS Administrator Seema Verma, 
“Healthcare remains in a 1990s time warp.”31 Indeed, healthcare administration 
was adversely impacted by the last healthcare technology shift: EHR adoption. 
                                               
 28. See generally AJAY AGRAWAL, JOSHUA GANS & AVI GOLDFARB, PREDICTION MACHINES: THE 
SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 14-15 (Harvard Business Rev. Press 2018) (ebook). 
 29. JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., A FUTURE THAT WORKS: AUTOMATION, 
EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY 23 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/
mckinsey/featured%20insights/Digital%20Disruption/Harnessing%20automation%20for%20a%20future%20th
at%20works/MGI-A-future-that-works-Executive-summary.ashx. 
 30. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY 18 
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence- 
Automation-Economy.PDF. 
 31. Susan Morse, CMS Administrator Seema Verma Calls for an End to Physician Fax Machines by 2020, 
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/cms-administrator-seema-
verma-calls-end-physician-fax-machines-2020. 
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One of the negative impacts that came with HER adoption was the shift of 
administrative tasks to physicians, resulting in workforce misalignment.32 In the 
words of Atul Gawande, “I’ve come to feel that a system that promised to increase 
my mastery over my work has, instead, increased my work’s mastery over me.”33 
Thanks to AI, hospital and physician offices will see the increased use of “robotic 
process automation.”34 designed to automate routine or mundane office tasks such 
as making appointments, billing patients, and requesting reimbursement.35 Natural 
language processing and digital assistants should improve note-taking and 
decrease the use of the main EHR “hack”, the use of scribes36 The next stage will 
be face identification for patient check-in.37 AI analytics eventually will take over 
other tedious administrative tasks from humans including optimizing work force 
deployment, reducing readmissions while improving outcomes,38 identifying high 
risk patients,39 keeping referrals within network,40 and combating fraud.41 
Custodial 
In much the same way that persons fulfill basic administrative tasks like 
billing, hospital custodial staff engage in repetitive or mundane tasks. Increasingly, 
healthcare facilities will replace many of their custodial staff with service robots 
such as the driverless vehicles that pull laundry and other carts around healthcare 
                                               
 32. See Jennifer Adaeze Okwerekwu, Working at the ‘Top of My License’ Means I Sometimes Have To 
Say No, STAT NEWS (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/04/28/doctors-license-training. 
 33. Atul Gawande, Why Doctors Hate Their Computers, NEW YORKER (November 12, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/11/12/why-doctors-hate-their-computers. 
 34. Steve Lohr, ‘The Beginning of a Wave’: A.I. Tiptoes Into the Workplace, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/05/technology/workplace-ai.html. 
 35. Cf. Alastair Gale and Takashi Mochizuki, Robot Hotel Loses Love for Robots, WALL ST J. (Jan. 14, 
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robot-hotel-loses-love-for-robots-11547484628 (noting that automated 
hotel is laying off its low-performing robots) 
 36. See Katie Hafnerjan, A Busy Doctor’s Right Hand, Ever Ready to Type, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/health/a-busy-doctors-right-hand-ever-ready-to-type.html. 
 37. Liang Chenyu, Zhejiang Hospital Scans Faces to Register Patients, SIXTH TONE (Oct 16, 2018), 
http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1003064/zhejiang-hospital-scans-faces-to-register-patients. 
 38. The Crimson™ Technology Suite, ADVISORY BOARD, http://www.advisory.com/Technology/Crimson 
(archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20170710171838/https://www.advisory.com/technology/crimson). See 
generally Anna Wilde Mathews, Hospitals Prescribe Big Data to Track Doctors at Work, WALL ST. J. at A1, 
July 11, 2013; Rx to Avoid Health-Law Fines, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887323838204578654152046151798.html. 
 39. Haas LR et al, Risk-stratification methods for identifying patients for care coordination. 19 AM J 
MANAG CARE. 725, 725-32 (2013). 
 40. Crimson Medical Referrals, ADVISORY BOARD, https://www.advisory.com/technology/crimson-
medical-referrals (archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20190120021342/https://www.advisory.com/
technology/crimson-medical-referrals). 
 41. Roger Foster, Top 9 Fraud and Abuse Areas Big Data Tools Can Target, GOVERNMENT HEALTH IT 
(May 14, 2012), http://www.govhealthit.com/news/part-3-9-fraud-and-abuse-areas-big-data-can-target. 
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facilities,42 food service, 43machines that clean rooms of healthcare associated 
infections,44 and automated pharmacy storage and retrieval systems.45 
Administrative, clinical, and custodial domains increasingly will share their data. 
For example, an AI administrative system should be able to combine outpatient 
appointment data, check-in data and data about visit lengths, cross-check local 
travel conditions, and accurately predict and control patient flow and workforce 
requirements. Such a system should enable another “hack,” waiting-rooms, our 
current “imperfect solutions to uncertainty,” to be eliminated.46 
Mobile Medical Apps, Wearables, and Chatbots 
Apps and wearables on mobile software platforms are established consumer 
technologies with their own evolving typologies47 and regulatory challenges.48 
Currently, they function less as substitutes and more as an additional layer of 
technology, for example allowing patients to securely curate their own health 
records.49 However, as their sensors and analytical software become more 
sophisticated, they will increasingly supplant professional early warning or 
diagnostic tasks50, particularly as they integrate more fully with networked 
environmental sensors.51 Their importance will be further elevated in the 
monitoring of chronic diseases and collecting data for clinical trials. Related to 
apps are chatbots, AI-based diagnostic triage systems that use language parsing 
coupled with searches of large databases to correlate symptoms and conditions. 
Subsequently, they make rule-based recommendations for an OTC remedy or 
make a physician referral.52 
                                               
 42. See, e.g., Matt Simon, Meet Tug, the Busy Little Robot Nurse Will See You Now, WIRED (Nov. 10, 
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/tug-the-busy-little-robot-nurse- will-see-you-now. 
 43. Josh Constine, Taste Test: Burger Robot Startup Creator Opens First Restaurant, TECHCRUNCH (June 
21, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/21/creator-hamburger-robot (discussing automated restaurant). 
 44. See, e.g., Why Choose Xenex?, XENEX, http://xenex.com/about-xenex. 
 45. See, e.g., BoxPicker® Automated Pharmacy Storage System, SWISSLOG,  https://www.swisslog.com/
en-us/healthcare/products/medication-management/boxpicker-automated-pharmacy-storage-system. 
 46. See AGRAWAL, GANS & GOLDFARB, supra note 28, at 105-06 (discussing aircraft lounges). 
 47. See, e.g., Nicolas Terry & Lindsay F. Wiley, Liability for Mobile Health and Wearable Technologies, 
25 ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 62, 66-70 (2016). 
 48. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 8, at 168-73.  
 49. See, e.g., iOS Health, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ios/health. 
 50. See, e.g., Simon Brandon, A Smartwatch Just Saved a Man from Having a Heart Attack, WORLD 
ECON. F. (Oct. 20, 2017) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/smartwatch-saved-man-from-heart-attack. 
 51. See generally Nicolas Terry, Will the Internet of Things Transform Healthcare?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 327 (2017). 
 52 Douglas Heaven, Your Next Doctor’s Appointment Might Be With an AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 16, 
2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612267/your-next-doctors-appointment-might-be-with-an-ai. 
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Caregiving 
AI will substitute for a broad category of family and professional caregiver 
functions.53 The technology will range from something as simple as a “robotic” 
crib designed to help a baby sleep better,54 to voice companions such as ElliQ that 
engage seniors in conversations and quizzes55, to simple robot companions for 
elderly persons such as Palro56, to robots such as RIBA that can lift and carry a 
person.57 
Research and Education 
Increasingly, pharmaceutical manufacturers are turning to AI to accelerate 
their drug development, primarily by searching for patterns in clinical data.58 
Routinely collected health data such as EHR data that was not initially collected 
for research purposes, together with data collected from wearables, is being used 
to train research AI. Furthermore, medical education will require fewer 
standardized or simulated patients59 as robot patient simulators increasingly will 
exhibit “natural” symptoms and react to stimuli,60 including AI simulations 
designed to teach empathy.61 Longer term (but probably on a shorter time frame in 
less developed countries), AI may fundamentally change medical education; with 
the AI increasingly substituting for professionalism, the question will arise as to 
whether the provider, the user of the AI, needs to be highly trained in advance or 
whether we will reach the stage of point of care learning.62 
                                               
 53. For a detailed treatment see VALARIE K. BLAKE, REGULATING THE MEDICAL ETHICS OF CARE 
ROBOTS, forthcoming. 
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 55. ELLIQ, https://elliq.com. 
 56. PALRO, https://palro.jp/en/case. 
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Burnout, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (September 18, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
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Clinical Data Analytics 
Whether used for research or to train clinical AI, data analytics is increasingly 
important in healthcare. Indeed, “The market for storing and analyzing health 
information is worth more than $7 billion a year”, attracting major technology 
companies such as Alphabet, Amazon, and Apple.63 As the analytics engines 
become more powerful their roles, they will evolve from descriptive to diagnostic 
to predictive. At some point the analytics likely will turn prescriptive, with the AI 
itself deciding to execute a task.64 As the amount of data that is fed into AI 
increases, so generally does its predictive abilities. Many of the most important 
breakthroughs therefore depend on feeding AI. For example, one proof of concept 
study used almost one quarter of a million electronic patient records, including 
clinical notes from two different hospitals and a total of almost 47 billion data 
points, and achieved high accuracy in predicting in-hospital mortality, unplanned 
readmissions, prolonged stay, and final discharge diagnoses.65 
Imaging, Pathology and Radiology 
It has been estimated that AI imaging will be a $2 billion business by 2023.66 
AI is particularly adept at pattern recognition, making it a natural fit for reading 
scans.67 For example, it has been used to detect skin cancer,68 colon cancer,69 
evidence of stroke,70 and pneumonia.71 Researchers have used Alphabet’s 
DeepMind to develop a deep learning algorithm for examining three-dimensional 
optical tomography scans.72 Panels of radiologists and pathologists are often asked 
to perform reads of scans; however, in a recent challenge competition, 7 deep 
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-starts-selling-software-to-mine-patient-health-records-1543352136. 
 64. See, e.g., Chris Nott, A Maturity Model for Big Data and Analytics, IBM BIG DATA & ANALYTICS 
HUB (May 26, 2015), http://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/blog/maturity-model-big-data-and-analytics. 
 65. Alvin Rajkomar et al, Scalable and Accurate Deep Learning with Electronic Health Records, 1 NPJ 
DIGITAL MEDICINE Art. 18 (2018). 
 66. Simon Harris, AI in Medical Imaging to Top $2 Billion by 2023, SIGNIFY RESEARCH (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.signifyresearch.net/medical-imaging/ai-medical-imaging-top-2-billion-2023. 
 67. See, e.g., Andre Esteva et al., Dermatologist-Level Classification of Skin Cancer with Deep Neural 
Networks, 542 NATURE 115, 115 (2017); Dom Galeon, AI-Assisted Detection Identifies Colon Cancer 
Automatically and in Real-Time, FUTURISM (Oct. 30, 2017), https://futurism.com/ai-assisted-detection-identifies-
colon-cancer-automatically-and-in-real-time/. See also John R. Zech et al., Variable Generalization Performance 
of a Deep Learning Model to Detect Pneumonia in Chest Radiographs: A Cross-sectional Study, 15 PLOS MED. 
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 70. Charles J. Lynch & Conor Liston, New Machine-learning Technologies for Computer-aided 
Diagnosis, 24 NATURE MED. 1304, 1304-05 (2018). 
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learning algorithms showed greater discrimination than a panel of 11 
pathologists.73 Some of these technologies have resulted in commercial, FDA-
approved products. For example, in 2017, the FDA approved Arterys, a cloud-
based deep learning imaging platform74 and in 2018 the FDA for the first time 
approved for sale AI algorithms; one designed to analyze two-dimensional x-rays 
to detect wrist fractures,75 and another to diagnose diabetic retinopathy from retinal 
scans.76 Another major platform, GE Healthcare’s Critical Care Suite, is currently 
undergoing approval.77 
Predictive diagnosis 
There are many varieties of Clinical Decision Support (CDS) systems in use 
and, overall, they promote positive outcomes, notwithstanding their persistent 
flaws, such as alert fatigue.78 However, the current generation of CDS is rule-
based. Using AI will create far more powerful tools. Properly trained AI has the 
potential to dramatically improve diagnosis.79 Its potential deserves emphasis, 
given that diagnostic errors effect five percent of U.S. outpatients annually, 
accounting for between six and seventeen percent of adverse events.80 Examples 
include machine-learning algorithms that are vastly improving early predictions of 
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diabetes and heart disease,81 incipient dementia,82 evidence of stroke,83 
determining whether colorectal polyps are merely benign,84 and the health of 
embryos for in vitro fertilization treatment.85 At a more pedestrian level, 
increasingly AI will also be incorporated in healthcare-related software, such as 
the analysis of emergency calls to detect cardiac arrest.86 One of the broadest (and 
controversial87) applications has been streams, an algorithm running on Google’s 
DeepMind that has been trained on more than a million patient records held by the 
Royal Free NHS Trust, that alerts clinicians about acute kidney disease in their 
patients.88 
Procedural AI 
As already noted, the current generation of surgical robots does not really 
deserve to be described as AI. Procedural aspects of medicine, particularly surgery, 
will likely remain in the human domain longer than other branches of medicine. 
Medium term we will see tiny robots injected into the body for targeted drug 
delivery as an alternative to surgery89 and there have already been proof of concept 
studies on fully autonomous surgery robots.90 The procedural domain has also seen 
its first controversy, when the FDA approved Sedasys automated anesthesia 
machine was withdrawn from the market after pushback from human 
anesthesiologists.91 
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B. Caveats about Substitution 
While substitution is an interesting rubric or at least an organizing concept, its 
value must not be overstated. As AI healthcare technologies are implemented, care 
will be needed lest substitution too heavily influences regulatory categories or 
determinations. For example, if an AI substitutes for a medical procedure, it does 
not necessarily follow that it is engaged in the “practice of medicine.” Similarly, 
just because an AI substitutes for, say, an innocuous hospital food cart, that would 
not necessarily be determinative of the safety of the AI cart. As Ignacio Cofone 
notes, “If it looks like a dog, walks like a dog, and barks like a dog, it might still 
not be (like) a dog for normative purposes.”92 The regulatory determinations must 
be made on the basis of AI risks and benefits, not the risks and benefits of what 
they substituted for. 
Substitution also requires context. Industrialized countries will tend to value 
patient-facing diagnostic or chronic care apps and wearables in terms of 
convenience, a substitute for visiting traditional brick-and-mortar care facilities. 
However, those in third world countries are more likely to embrace them, not as 
substitutes but as otherwise unobtainable healthcare.93 There, bots and apps may 
constitute the first organized healthcare with broad availability, while also 
radically improving medical education and access to care.94 Ironically, these 
worlds may see some merger (thereby supporting the reverse innovation theory95) 
as stressed first world healthcare systems try to meet demand with bots and apps. 
For example, the UK’s NHS has begun to integrate services such as Babylon 
Health.96 Some of these technologies are also targeted at underserved specialties 
such as behavioral health. For example, Marigold Health provides app-based 
support groups that are monitored both by care managers or peers and by an AI 
system that performs “sentiment analysis” to triage care.97 
Finally, substitution may have time-limited relevance for typing AI. Start with 
the question, why would a human build an automated process or a robot? 
Logically, it would be to substitute for a human process. This is true for neural 
networks, enabling computational photography in our phones, robot vacuum 
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cleaners, military killer drones, or complex, algorithm-driven data analytics. We 
build and substitute because we want to improve performance, avoid drudgery or 
risk, or minimize time and expense. However, we build only substitutes because, 
putting science fiction aside, as humans we lack a knowledge base beyond human 
processes in the physical world. Although it suggests philosophically murky 
territory, there will be a time when non-substitution AI arrives. However, it is 
unlikely to be the product of humans. Just as AI machine learning permits the 
creation of “new” data from training and input data or algorithmic processes 
outside of human understanding, future AI will itself be built by AI. 
III. EXTANT REGULATORY MODELS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
To a large extent the examination of healthcare AI regulation has concentrated 
on the applicability of FDA device regulation and the adequacy of our data 
protection laws. More recently, particularly as substitution rhetoric has taken hold, 
it has appeared on the radar of the state licensing boards.98 
The key concepts of “[medical] device” and the “practice of medicine” are not 
formally linked. The former is a function of federal law and a component of device 
supply chain regulation, the latter an exercise of state police power regulating 
clinicians. The FDA also makes clear that it does not regulate the practice of 
medicine, such as how and which physicians can use a device.99 Notwithstanding, 
the two regulatory systems do have interdependencies; for example, it is difficult 
to imagine the FDA granting approval for a surgical robot to be sold over the 
counter while some devices, such as contact lenses, require a prescription written 
by a state licensed provider. 
This article takes the position that neither of these path-dependent touchstones 
are particularly useful or transparent in determining whether and under what 
conditions AI healthcare should be approved or distributed. Specifically, it is a 
core tenet of this article that we abandon or supplement medical “device” and the 
“practice of medicine” as regulatory touchstones for healthcare AI. This is not only 
because they are inadequate to process the risks and benefits associated with AI 
but also because both are outdated touchstones for regulatory models that fail to 
sufficiently appreciate the “fundamental intertwining of the human and the 
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technological domains”100 involved in AI healthcare. 
Notwithstanding, this section begins with a basic sketch of FDA device 
regulation and medical licensure. It then explores additional regulatory and public 
and private ordering models that impact the implementation of healthcare AI. 
A. Device Regulation 
The idea of medical device regulation is relatively new, having been 
introduced by the Medical Device Amendments Act of 1976.101 Regulation (such 
as PMA or post-marketing surveillance) hinges on a lightly defined, functional 
threshold finding that the object of regulation is a “device”; something “intended 
for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease . . . or . . . intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body of man . . . “102 
The FDA regulatory process (based on “device”) sweeps up anything from a 
tongue depressor to a robotic-assisted, minimally invasive surgical system.103 As 
Nicholson Price explains, such a “piecemeal approach” when faced with rapidly 
developing technologies has resulted in problems of both overregulation and under 
regulation.104 As a result, a real question arises as to whether the FDA can keep up 
with the rapid innovations in digital health and, particularly, in healthcare AI. 105 
Congress attempted to help out its primary healthcare regulator and its 
struggles with emerging technologies in the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures). 
Although Cures excluded some healthcare software from the definition of 
device,106 most of the excluded application and apps (such as billing software and 
fitness trackers) were already the subject of sub-regulatory guidances indicating 
regulatory discretion. Furthermore, the legislation did not really solve the 
regulatory indeterminacy problem because there are carve-ins that could return 
some forms of software with risk profiles (and increasingly AI features) such as 
clinical decision software to regulated space.107 The FDA therefore has once again 
had to resort to interpretative and clarifying sub-regulatory guidances. For 
example, the agency has issued new guidances on medical software108 and 
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clinician-facing and patient-facing patient decision support software.109 
In this regard consider IBM’s Watson Health. Reportedly, IBM has lobbied 
Congress to exempt Watson from device regulation110 and was in part behind the 
partial medical software deregulation contained in Cures111 that resulted in the 
software exclusions already discussed. Presumably, IBM’s position is that Watson 
falls within Cure’s clinical decision support (CDS) software exemption because it 
assists physicians in diagnosis and treatment. However, as the AI improves, the 
strength of this argument inevitably will decrease. The Cures carve-in awaits such 
products at the point of AI primacy, the tipping points where the AI is going 
beyond “supporting or providing recommendations to a health care 
professional,”112 or no longer enables “such health care professional to 
independently review the basis for such recommendations that such software 
presents.”113 For example, the FDA does not interpret the independent review 
requirement as met “if the recommendation were based on non-public information 
or information whose meaning could not be expected to be independently 
understood by the intended health care professional user.”114 
Although this article contains implicit and explicit criticisms of the FDA, it is 
clear that that under Scott Gottlieb, its Commissioner between 2017-19, the FDA 
pushed hard on several fronts to transform its regulatory processes and reset the 
difficult safety-innovation dichotomy it faces.115 For example, in an April 2018 
speech Gottlieb noted “AI holds enormous promise for the future of medicine” and 
that “we must also recognize that FDA’s usual approach to medical product 
regulation is not always well suited to emerging technologies like digital health, or 
the rapid pace of change in this area. If we want American patients to benefit from 
innovation, FDA itself must be as nimble and innovative as the technologies we’re 
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regulating.”116 
The agency’s Digital Health Innovation Action Plan117 is multi-faceted and, 
to an extent, is dependent on building out internal expertise to deal with emerging 
technologies.118 More substantively, it seems consistent with Nicholson Price’s 
model of combining “more moderate up-front regulation . . . with robust 
postmarket surveillance to monitor the performance of algorithms in real-world 
settings.”119 The agency’s pivot has some smaller components such as a liberalized 
risk-based approach to outputs from software disseminated by a drug manufacturer 
that accompanies a prescription drug.120 However, the centerpiece of the 
Innovation Action Plan is the agency’s Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program that 
aspires to better align regulatory and technology iteration cycles by using a 
surrogate for device approval based on certifying manufacturers and their safety-
testing protocols that evidence “excellence.”121 The most recent iteration notes 
how “FDA’s traditional approach for the regulation of hardware-based medical 
devices is not well-suited for the faster, iterative design and development, and type 
of validation used for software device functions.”122 The program is aimed at 
“Software as a Medical Device” (SaMD)123 “which may include software functions 
that use artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms..”124 
A recent FDA Discussion Paper highlights the problems that lie ahead for 
traditional regulatory mechanism.125 So far FDA cleared or approved AI/ML-based 
SaMD have used “locked” algorithms, suggesting that future changes to the 
algorithm would require additional review.  However, as the agency points out, 
“not all AI/ML-based SaMD are locked; some algorithms can adapt over time… 
Following distribution, these types of continuously learning and adaptive AI/ML 
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algorithms may provide a different output in comparison to the output initially 
cleared for a given set of inputs.” The FDA-proposed framework for these 
unlocked algorithms is somewhat based on the Pre-Cert program and would 
employ a “Total Product Lifecycle Regulatory Approach” requiring, for example, 
a risk-based protocol for the development of the algorithm and robust monitoring 
of its changes.126 
While innovation may be promoted with accelerated approval timelines and 
expedited models such as Pre-Cert, concerns have been raised by the large numbers 
of recent device approvals. An AP study published in late 2018 argued that a new 
FDA policy of being “first in the world” to approve new devices that led to a 
tripling of annual approvals has relied on less rigorous studies while at the same 
time the issuance of safety warning letters has declined by eighty per cent.127 
B. Licensure 
In the broadest sense it is arguable that AI “requires a licence to operate from 
the public, based on trustworthiness.”128 In the far narrower context, that of 
professional licensure, it may seem questionable whether the state boards that are 
responsible for the licensing and discipline of physicians and other clinicians have 
anything more than a tangential relationship with the regulation of healthcare AI. 
Certainly, the mere fact that reportedly a robot was capable of passing the national 
medical licensing examination in China129 says little about the actual practice of 
medicine. 
The touchstone for medical licensure is “the practice of medicine.” In most 
states, this includes holding oneself out as authorized to practice medicine in a 
jurisdiction, prescribing or administering a drug, diagnosing or treating disease, 
illness, or condition, performing surgery, or rendering a medical opinion.130 In 
general, practicing medicine without a license is illegal. Those who are licensed 
are subject to standards of professional conduct derived from both ethical (e.g., 
truthfulness and transparency) and legal codes (e.g., confidentiality and reasonable 
care) and to disciplinary sanctions in the case of their breach.131 
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Perhaps surprisingly, medical licensure regulation does have salience here. 
First, the most direct claim of all could be made that some future (and likely 
diagnostic or procedural) AI constitutes the “practice of medicine” under state law, 
requires a license, and is subject to other board requirements that vary from state 
to state but may include matters such as records retention and confidentiality. 
Presumably courts will be faced with the argument 
that licensing statutes tend to use “person” language, rather than refer to 
device or object.132 The opposing argument likely will concentrate on the 
identifying the natural or legal person making use of the AI. 
Second, there are legal and organizational concepts that are related to the 
practice of medicine touchstone that may have far more relevance. These include 
the corporate practice of medicine (CPM) doctrine and scope of practice issues. 
The CPM doctrine embraced by some states is a correlate to the practice of 
medicine doctrine in that it prohibits those who cannot be personally licensed, 
specifically corporations, from either practicing medicine or employing physicians 
to do the same.133 The justifications for the continued existence of the doctrine are 
the maintenance of individual physician judgment and upholding the quality of 
care.134 Presumably, healthcare AI would at some point transgress this rule and in 
some cases be unable to leverage a popular exception to the prohibition, that of 
being a licensed hospital.135 
Another practice of medicine correlate is scope of practice; the extent the 
limits of practice determined by licensure or board certification. The implications 
for healthcare AI are twofold. First, questions are likely to arise as to what aspects 
of healthcare specific AI should be allowed to “practice,” for example whether an 
algorithm or robot designed for one task could be used for another. Second, 
(although not endorsed here) scope of practice could be adapted to regulate 
healthcare AI. The scope of practice of nurse practitioners (NPs) varies depending 
on state.136 Some jurisdictions allow NPs to diagnose and treat without any 
involvement from a physician. Others require different levels of physician 
involvement, from working within protocols or having samples of their work 
reviewed. A similar model could be imagined for the way licensed physicians and 
healthcare AI may interact. For example, an autonomous AI could be allowed to 
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treat certain diseases or administer certain treatments so long as it was under 
physician supervision or acting within physician-set guardrails. 
Third, and a related concept: assuming that state medical boards do not 
regulate healthcare AI, they will be interested in how physicians interact with 
healthcare AI just as currently they are interested in physician-NP interprofessional 
collaboration and co-management of patient populations.137 The boards will likely 
assert ethical supervision of such relationships, watching for conflicts of interest, 
breach of confidentiality, etc. Boards are also likely to be invested in physician 
primacy. This is not a particularly new issue, an earlier context being the 
accelerated implementation of CDS. There the issue has been framed as one of 
physician autonomy—whether the physician should comply with received 
alerts.138 
Finally, although not strictly regulatory, organized medicine exerts 
considerable lobbying weight. The state boards, their national association (the 
Federation of State Medical Boards), the AMA and other professional 
organizations are powerful stakeholders that will influence the regulation of 
healthcare AI. Many members of the profession will welcome a new age of 
medicine. However, as with just about every attempted healthcare disruption or 
even more gentle reforms, some healthcare stakeholders will have no incentive to 
change. For others, adoption of AI or robotics will be welcomed only if it does not 
weaken their incumbent positions or their reimbursement. Given the potential for 
economic or other objections there is the risk that some board members may 
leverage their licensure and disciplinary powers to protect their own or their 
colleagues’ income streams even though the technologies have become safer or 
new alternative technologies are available. There are historic examples such as the 
distribution of contact lenses,139 other products that are sold inexpensively over-
the-counter (OTC) outside the U.S.,140 and telemedicine.141 If, when dominated by 
market participants, boards do stray into such territory, antitrust laws likely will be 
invoked under the guidelines established by the Supreme Court in North Carolina 
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State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC.142 
C. Privacy & Confidentiality 
Healthcare AI will join the pantheon of healthcare technologies such as mobile 
apps and big data that while promising much in the way of convenience, the 
reduction of friction, or efficiency have been dogged by concerns over their threat 
to the privacy of patient information. Inevitably, emerging technologies that share 
or process medical data will raise data protection concerns. However, the U.S. 
system is particularly challenged in the effectiveness of its responses. 
U.S. data protection exhibits three fundamental flaws. First, it has been 
constructed using a sectoral approach, operationalized by the piecemeal 
introduction of discrete data protection regimes for different sectors or 
industries.143 Second, these regimes favor somewhat conservative models of data 
protection that in general regulate how data custodians protect and use data 
(downstream protections) rather than data collection and retention (upstream 
protections).144 Third, and a consequence of the first flaw, is that the different 
domain regulations are usually accompanied by a discrete regulator. Even where 
an exception to this model arises, such as the FTC’s broad cross-sector 
jurisdiction,145 it tends to be restricted by a distinctly narrow data protection mode, 
such as the FTC’s Section 5 prohibition on “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices,”146 that in practice limits agency actions to parsing privacy policies or 
other representations by sellers147 or dealing with repeat offenders.148 
Data collected by AI or robots controlled by “covered entities” or their 
“business associates” (HIPAA entities) will in most cases be protected by the 
HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification rules.149 Those rules are 
enforced by a healthcare-specific regulatory agency, HHS-OCR.150 In contrast, AI 
or robots controlled by non-HIPAA entities will benefit from a far more generous 
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data protection model. Entities in that space still will need to obey private party 
rules (such as app store or other distribution restrictions) and should stay well away 
from some highly specific regulatory regimes (such as credit reporting151). But 
otherwise, absent “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,”152 their data practices will 
essentially be unregulated.153 For example, if hospital laundry or pharmacy tugs 
and pickers or telepresence and caregiver robots incidentally capture patient data 
those data likely will be regulated by HIPAA. However, if the same or similar 
technologies were purchased by an individual on the consumer market (imagine 
the “Best Robot Buy” big box store of the future), HIPAA is unlikely to apply. 
Given these uneven policy environments, an unnecessarily narrow view of 
data protection, and piecemeal enforcement, the key data protection problems 
raised by AI and robots are similar to those posed by the availability of mobile 
medical apps and the processing of medically-inflected data by data-brokers—
regulatory disruption and arbitrage.154 The disruption is caused by unmet 
expectations and indeterminacy. For example, privacy expectations that healthcare 
data is well-protected without any contextual exceptions are created by HIPAA 
privacy notices, while indeterminacy is caused by difficulty in identifying either 
regulation or regulator if HIPAA does not apply. The arbitrage is facilitated by 
data analytics entities being third parties with whom the patient or pre-patient has 
had no direct relationship and so no ability to assert (even limited) data protection 
rights; the data is being acquired from another entity (e.g., a supermarket record of 
the pre-patient’s OTC purchases). The actual arbitrage is achieved by using non-
HIPAA data or “laundered” HIPAA data to build healthcare data profiles outside 
of the HIPAA-regulated zone.155 
D. Reimbursement 
In the U.S., perhaps more than any other country, the question of whether a 
healthcare technology will be implemented is as much dependent on whether its 
use will be reimbursed as it is on other more direct regulation. A classic example 
is telehealth which is finally showing potential for growth after the recent 
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announcement of Medicare reimbursement for home health remote patient 
monitoring.156 
Of course, public and private payers are already users of sophisticated AI data 
mining systems designed to detect fraud and otherwise analyze provide 
performance, such as those authorized by the Medicare and Medicaid Program 
Integrity provisions of the Affordable Care Act.157 However, payers may be less 
interested in reimbursing healthcare AI absent strong evidence of its cost-
effectiveness or comparative effectiveness, vis-à-vis existing treatments.158 Health 
insurer enthusiasm for healthcare AI must also be scrutinized because of how they 
may use the “lifestyle” data that they collect amid concerns that it is being used to 
cherry-pick healthier patients159, notwithstanding the ACA’s prohibitions on 
medical underwriting.160 
In general, reimbursement is provided for “medically necessary” care and 
experimental treatments or devices are unlikely to be covered. Beyond that, 
reimbursement is a matter of policy and incentives. Of considerable interest is the 
October 2018 announcement by CMS recognizing “patients may experience 
unnecessary gaps between FDA approval of a technology and Medicare paying for 
the technology” and changes being made to the local coverage determination process161 such that 
“coverage decisions will be more transparent and more responsive to innovators bringing new medical technologies to our 
Medicare beneficiaries.”162 Changes in CMS adoption of technologies is doubly important 
because private insurers often follow trends established by public payers. 
E. Market Forces 
Related to regulation through reimbursement are general market forces. The 
healthcare technology market can be quite brutal. For example, there has been 
consistent negative reporting concerning IBM’s Watson supercomputer. Having 
set its sights on becoming the preeminent cancer treatment system. “Watson for 
Oncology” appears to be struggling, both as to its capabilities and its 
implementation. Its once celebrated partnership between the MD Anderson Cancer 
                                               
 156. Press Release, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS Takes Action to Modernize Medicare 
Home Health (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-takes-action-modernize-
medicare-home-health-0. 
 157. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 §6402 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7k). 
 158. See discussion at text accompanying note 247. 
 159. Marshall Allen, Health Insurers Are Vacuuming Up Details About You—And It Could Raise Your 
Rates, PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/health-insurers-are-vacuuming-up-
details-about-you-and-it-could-raise-your-rates. 
 160. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2018). 
 161. See generally Medicare Coverage Determination Process, CMS.GOV (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/DeterminationProcess/index.html. 
 162. Seema Verma, Modernizing Medicare to Take Advantage of the Latest Technologies, CMS BLOG (Oct. 
2 2018), https://www.cms.gov/blog/modernizing-medicare-take-advantage-latest-technologies. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3321379 
OF REGULATING HEALTHCARE AI AND ROBOTS 
 
25 
Center and IBM to use the Watson platform for cancer research was put on hold 
after Watson reportedly after cost issues and a failure to meet its goals.163 For 
example, it has been reported that the Watson for Oncology software often 
recommended erroneous cancer treatments, with internal studies suggesting that 
AI had not been trained on sufficient patient data or treatment guidelines.164 Most 
tellingly, one report concluded that, despite the claims made for Watson, “the 
system doesn’t create new knowledge and is artificially intelligent only in the most 
rudimentary sense of the term.”165 There are also reports that IBM is scaling back 
other parts of Watson Health business, such as helping hospitals manage pay for 
performance reimbursement because of reduced demand166 and that the Watson 
division was laying off staff as it lost customers who were “fed up.”167 In large 
part, it appears that Watson has had difficulty developing technology to import 
clinical data such as that found in EHRs using natural language processing.168 IBM 
has also been the subject of a particularly scathing report from an analyst 
suggesting that Watson was falling behind other technology companies in the deep 
learning space.169 
It is arguable that other major players in healthcare AI are barely playing by 
market rules. For example, it was been reported that Google’s DeepMind posted 
losses of $164 million in 2016 and $368 million in 2017. Essentially, big 
technology’s healthcare AI projects are being subsidized by other parts of 
businesses at Amazon and Google. For example, Amazon’s growing footprint in 
healthcare, for example developing at-home diagnostic products170, is consistent 
with its corporate goal of extracting profit from all transactions and its own 
                                               
 163. Matthew Herper, MD Anderson Benches IBM Watson in Setback for Artificial Intelligence in 
Medicine, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2017, 3:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/02/19/md-
anderson-benches-ibm-watson-in-setback-for-artificial-intelligence-in-medicine/#50720f0f3774. 
 164. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM’s Watson Supercomputer Recommended ‘Unsafe and Incorrect’ 
Cancer Treatments, Internal Documents Show, STAT (July 25, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/
2018/07/25/ibm-watson-recommended-unsafe-incorrect-treatments. 
 165. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM Pitched Its Watson Supercomputer As A Revolution In Cancer Care. 
It’s Nowhere Close, STAT (Sep. 5, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/09/05/watson-ibm-cancer. 
 166. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, Citing Weak Demand, IBM Watson Health to Scale Back Hospital 
Business, STAT (June 15, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/06/15/ibm-watson-health-scale-back-hospital-
business. 
 167. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM’s Problems with Watson Health Run Deeper Than Recent Layoffs, 
Former Employees Say, STAT (June 11, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/06/11/ibm-watson-health-
problems-layoffs. 
 168. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, How an IBM Watson Health Rescue Mission Collapsed—and a Top 
Executive Was Ousted, STAT (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/11/01/ibm-watson-health-natural-
language-processing. 
 169. John Mannes, Jefferies Gives IBM Watson a Wall Street Reality Check, TECHCRUNCH (July 13, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/13/jefferies-gives-ibm-watson-a-wall-street-reality-check. 
 170. Christina Farr & Eugene Kim, Amazon Has Explored Getting Into Consumer Health Diagnostics—
Testing For Disease At Home, CNBC (Dec. 14 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/14/amazon-explored-
medical-diagnostics-was-in-talks-to-buy-confer-health.html. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3321379 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 18:3 (2019) 
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 21:3 (2019) 
26 
healthcare ambitions.171 Similarly, Google’s collection and processing of clinical 
data may in part be designed to improve its search tools and so value to advertisers; 
one reason possibly behind its decision to directly manage DeepMind Health.172 
Of course, markets themselves can be the subject of government regulation. 
This primarily occurs when there is market failure, of which there are several 
examples in healthcare technology space. In such cases, government will intervene 
to attempt to cure the failure. For example, in the late 1990s CMS mandated the 
healthcare industry to migrate to e-commerce platforms to achieve 
“Administrative Simplification.”173 Almost two decades later The Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 attempted 
to cure apparent market failure in the adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) 
with a subsidy model.174 There are, therefore, levers other than reimbursement to 
build umbrella structures to facilitate data-sharing or to stimulate adoption if, for 
example, some AI application showed great promise to reduce public health costs 
but its poor return-on-investment made it unattractive to hospitals. 
F. Litigation 
Almost inevitably healthcare AI will be touched by litigation. Injured patients 
will no doubt attempt to apply that state law liability doctrine to healthcare 
professionals, healthcare institutions, and healthcare AI developers.175 Although 
involving a surgical teleoperation “robot” rather than true healthcare AI, the 
Supreme Court of Washington case Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.,176 is 
instructive as to the types of issues that may arise. A patient suffered injuries and 
later died following complications that arose during a robotic prostatectomy. 
Although the doctor was highly experienced in performing open prostatectomies, 
he had only performed two proctored procedures with the robot and the surgery in 
question was his first unproctored procedure. At trial, there was conflicting 
evidence about the level of training that should be required prior to an unproctored 
procedure, the question of the appropriateness of using the robot on a person with 
a high body mass index, and the role of the hospital in ensuring safe use of the 
device. The appeal was decided on a further issue, with the court holding that under 
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state product liability law the learned intermediary doctrine did not absolve the 
manufacturer from warning the hospital about risks associated with its products. 
Taylor puts several future issues on display. For example, which members of the 
distribution chain will face liability and under what legal theory and what are the 
relative responsibilities of hospitals and developers in training physicians and 
developing or enforcing protocols for the implementation of AI generally or its use 
in a particular case? 
Other, more detailed issues, will need disposition. First, if robots are granted 
some level of social valence, a question might arise as to whether they have a direct 
relationship with the patient akin to the physician-patient relationship. Second, the 
scope of a human physician’s responsibility in interacting with healthcare AI will 
be in play, again raising the question of the ultimate decisionmaker, clinician or AI 
(at least, until we reach the tipping point of AI primacy)? 
Third, as healthcare institutions invest in AI, their own liability may shift. For 
example, traditionally hospitals have argued that they are not directly liable for the 
negligence of their independent contractor physicians who practice within their 
walls.177 However, as those physicians are replaced or supplemented by AI, courts 
may view the healthcare as institutionally provided services and apply what is 
known as direct or corporate liability.178 Additionally, litigation may itself be a 
driver of AI adoption if plaintiffs argue that the standard of care owed by hospitals 
necessitates the implementation of, for example, diagnostic algorithms.179 
Fourth, courts are likely to face some very difficult doctrinal questions. For 
example, the question arises whether healthcare AI, particularly bare software 
algorithms, would be considered products for strict liability purposes given the 
Restatement’s definition of a product as “tangible personal property distributed 
commercially for use or consumption.”180 The issue is complex and outside the 
scope of this article. However, it is at least arguable that non-custom software that 
causes physical damage is subject to strict liability.181 Additional complications 
arise in the device space due to the preemption doctrine. In very general terms, 
state product liability claims regarding Class III medical device approved by the 
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FDA through the PMA process are expressly preempted.182 However, state law 
actions involving 510(k) devices, those approved on the basis of predicate device, 
generally are not preempted.183 Of course, manufacturers of products that are not 
“devices” and so not subject to FDA regulation, such as (possibly) some custodial, 
caregiver, and companion robots, will not enjoy preemption arguments, and face 
strict liability. 
Actions against the manufacturers of autonomous vehicles likely will act as 
canaries in the coalmine for healthcare AI liability. As the number of such vehicles 
increase so also have there been questions relating to their quality184 and safety.185 
The inevitable litigation likely will establish an important new marker for when 
liability is imposed on the manufacturer rather than the driver. Healthcare AI 
litigation is potentially even more interesting as it has the potential to reallocate 
adverse event costs from physicians to healthcare entities and developers. 
IV. A MORE RESPONSIVE REGULATORY MATRIX 
There are several touchstones for a new regulatory model for AI. First it must 
be unitary, not fragmented like today’s medical device/practice of medicine 
duopoly. Second, it must be more holistic; any regulatory system must extend 
beyond quality, safety and efficacy with a broader consideration of inputs (e.g., 
transparency and data protection) and outputs (e.g., cost effectiveness and social 
impact). 
Third, the regulation of AI should be universal and not domain specific. There 
are good arguments in favor of healthcare regulatory exceptionalism, from the 
protection required of particularly vulnerable populations through the sensitive 
nature of healthcare data.186 However, the far-reaching implications of AI argue 
against any structures that would regulatory indeterminacy or arbitrage. Further, a 
domain agnostic model does not require that the specific ethical and legal needs of 
the healthcare domain should be ignored, only that the principles applicable to 
specific domains must be derived from and consistent with universal principles.187 
Fourth, a comment from the 2018 European Commission report is particularly 
instructive. While acknowledging the necessity of “avoiding detrimental or 
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unintended consequences, or guaranteeing that humans have control over their 
technologies”, the report argued that such “externalist and instrumentalist 
perspectives tend to separate technologies from humans,” viewing “technologies 
as mere neutral tools devoid of values, and humans as sole masters defining the 
terms of engagement.188 Thus, future AI regulation must be contextually aware and 
responsive to what may be major shifts in the man-machine relationship. At the 
extreme, that analysis could change quite fundamentally if robots were granted any 
type of social valence. Finally, these regulatory changes must be made soon. One 
does not have to buy into the full dystopian vision of future AI to urge haste, merely 
that these changes need to be made before the point of AI primacy, when the AI 
takes over aspects of healthcare decision-making. 
The construction of any new regulatory model must be based on generally 
accepted ethical and moral frameworks. The identification of those frameworks 
should include examination for how the frameworks can be validated and 
technologically infused into AI. The frameworks require supplementation with 
agreement over some broader questions; for example, the extent to which the data 
on which AI are trained and the data generated by AI are public goods and the 
protection of both individual and societal interests from surveillance and 
datafication. All of these frameworks are key. They also build to consideration of 
the final framework that consists of the elimination of discrimination, the 
promotion of health equity, and transparency. Together, these perhaps more than 
any other represent the battle for the “soul” of healthcare AI; whether like most 
traditional healthcare today it can be developed to be trustworthy and committed 
to beneficence or whether it will fuel the worst aspects of healthcare technocracy. 
A. Normative Questions 
Building a responsive regulatory system begins with identifying the normative 
underpinnings. It is relatively easy to trot out familiar healthcare platitudes. Of 
course, we will want our AI to be inexpensive, promote well-being, and be patient-
centric. Equally, there are enough affinities between healthcare’s frequently 
misattributed “primum non nocere” 189 and Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of 
Robotics” that we will not seriously debate hard-coded imperatives such as “A 
robot may not injure a human being” or “A robot must obey orders given it by 
human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.” 190 
However, both healthcare and AI involve normative challenges of far greater 
complexity. The tensions inherent in William Kissick’s healthcare iron triangle 
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(access, quality, and cost containment) are such that “Tradeoffs are inevitable 
regardless of the size of the triangle.” 191 Healthcare policies and the laws that 
implement them continually make high-level distributional choices that have 
momentous implications for the well-being and even life of groups and individuals. 
And they reflect values that frequently fail broadly-held moral or ethical principles. 
For example, the U.S. healthcare system is generally unavailable for large swathes 
of the population, the poor who are too young for Medicare or above the meagre 
FPL limits for Medicaid. Even among the insured, those with better access to care, 
public and private policymakers impact individual well-being through the choices 
they make about dental or eye care coverage, drug-tiering, OOP expenses for hip 
or knee replacements, hospice coverage, etc. Not all of these choices are system-
wide; some depend on geography and adversely impact persons who live in 
(primarily) Southern states that spend relatively little on healthcare and refuse to 
expand Medicaid. Other choices are not system-wide but are a function of 
individuals working in the system; mid-level administrators denying valid claims 
or clinicians allowing their implicit biases to affect the treatment provided to a 
patient of color. There are also likely to be disconnects over issues such as 
maximizing profit between those designing healthcare AI and those delivering care 
at the bedside.192 
Healthcare AI like the humans it substitutes will have to deal with the 
healthcare system’s chaotic multi-level choice architectures. An AI system 
designed to maximize value-based purchasing will make trade-offs as will a 
caregiver robot choosing which of its two chronically-ill patients to bathe first. Just 
as with the humans they substitute for, AI will make decisions that, downstream, 
impact access to or the quality of care. The question, therefore, is how do we 
program AI to make the “best” decisions, those that are aligned with our “best” 
moral and ethical principles? 
This is, at least, a two-part inquiry. First, where do we find these moral and 
ethical principles? Second, after we convert these human normative values for 
machine use, how do we validate them such that patients and other non-
policymaker stakeholders will trust our new medical machines? 
AI ethical and moral principles (and here only a few examples can be given) 
have been advanced not only in innumerable statements of general applicability 
but also by stakeholders and researchers with specific health domain expertise.193 
As an example of the former, Google has published a series of “Objectives for AI 
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applications,” that include the avoidance of unfair bias and accountability.194 IBM 
Research’s AI Ethics group195 has published AI principles based on 
Accountability, Value Alignment, Explainability, Fairness, and User Data 
Rights.196 The company also has laid out guiding principles for AI deployment, (1) 
Purpose—to augment humans and be of service to them, (2) Transparency—how 
they were trained and with what data, and (3) Skills—building AI in partnership 
with persons with domain knowledge and training those in the domain to use the 
tools.197 
In public policy space, the European Commission has classified AI challenges 
as manifesting at both individual and societal levels. Individual challenges 
identified include autonomy, identity, dignity, and data protection. Societal 
challenges included fairness and equity, collective human identity, responsibility, 
accountability and transparency, surveillance and datafication, democracy and 
trust, and the extent that collected knowledge should be viewed as a public good.198 
The Commission has recognized that the progression from these challenges to a 
new ethical framework for AI has lagged behind the technological developments 
but suggested two new “rights;” a right to choose “meaningful human contact” 
over robot contact and “the right to refuse being profiled, tracked, measured, 
analysed, coached or manipulated.199 
In April 2019 the Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial 
Intelligence published Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI. The guidance took the 
position that “Only by ensuring trustworthiness will European individuals fully 
reap AI systems’ benefits, secure in the knowledge that measures are in place to 
safeguard against their potential risks.” 200 Trustworthy AI should be lawful, have 
an ethical purpose, and should be technically and socially robust (to better avoid 
unintentional harms).201 The guidance expresses the concepts of ethical purpose 
and human-centric development as based on four principles or values; respect for 
human autonomy, prevention of harm, fairness and explicability..202 
In the narrower healthcare domain, the AMA has published a policy guide on 
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healthcare AI.203 In part, it seems less concerned about AI healthcare ethics and 
more about how the association sees its stakeholder role going forward; for 
example, it seeks to “Identify opportunities to integrate the perspective of 
practicing physicians into the development, design, validation and implementation 
of health care AI” and “Encourage education for patients, physicians, medical 
students, other health care professionals, and health administrators to promote 
greater understanding of the promise and limitations of health care AI.”204 
Notwithstanding, the AMA’s guide included some more actionable principles 
calling for AI that is transparent, reproducible, addresses bias, and “avoids 
introducing or exacerbating health care disparities including when testing or 
deploying new AI tools on vulnerable populations”205 
Finally, representing bioethicists, Effy Vayena and colleagues have proposed 
that AI must satisfy three ethical concerns: that the data used complies with data 
protection requirements, that the AI development respects fairness by avoiding 
biased training data sets, and that the technology’s deployment should satisfy 
transparency and avoid the “black box” problem.206 Specifically with regard to this 
last the authors argue, “the disclosure of basic yet meaningful details about medical 
treatment to patients—a fundamental tenet of medical ethics—requires that the 
doctors themselves grasp at least the fundamental inner workings of the devices 
they use.”207 
A definitive synthesis of all these proposals is outside the scope of this article. 
However, issues such as transparency (and the related idea of reproducibility), 
avoidance of bias (both in the training data and in the algorithms), equity, cost-
effectiveness, and data protection (privacy and security by design) are frequently 
mentioned. These seem to be appropriate underpinnings for addressing typical 
healthcare AI. However, as the healthcare AI field gets more specialized 
additional, context-sensitive constructs may need to be added to or derived from 
these general ethical and moral constructs; for example, to address specific ethical 
questions related to neuroengineering and human augmentation.208 
A previous article argued that as AI healthcare data technologies become 
increasingly autonomous, we will have to address the possibility and desirability 
of programming ethical frameworks or artificial moral agents into the AI.209 In that 
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context I referenced the “Trolley Problem,” the thought experiment that addresses 
how actors react to the relative worth of persons when a technology threatens life 
or serious injuries.210 Recently there has been progress in programming AI to 
improve ethical and other hard choices. For example, Andrea Loreggia and 
colleagues have developed algorithms designed to check AI priorities against 
ethical principles,211 while other IBM researchers have designed general purpose 
algorithms to audit systems for bias and mitigate same.212 
Notwithstanding, there are important meta questions about any norms we 
embed in our AI. Whose norms or values, are they? For example, is it sufficient to 
canvas various governmental, industry, and academic stakeholders about how the 
machines should be programmed? The European Commission has been clear on 
the issue, “Ethical and secure-by-design algorithms are crucial to build trust in this 
disruptive technology, but we also need a broader engagement of civil society on 
the values to be embedded in AI and the directions for future development.”213 
Similarly, Edmond Awad and colleagues argue “even if ethicists were to agree 
on how autonomous vehicles should solve moral dilemmas, their work would be 
useless if citizens were to disagree with their solution, and thus opt out of the future 
that autonomous vehicles promise in lieu of the status quo.214 Awad and his 
colleagues built a Moral Machine to assess social expectations about the ethical 
programming of autonomous vehicles. Various scenarios were imagined such as 
sparing many lives over fewer, the young over the elderly, men over women, etc.215 
The experiment attracted almost 40 million responses from over 200 countries. 
Some collected preferences differed markedly from ethical positions taken by 
regulators. For example, those surveyed showed a clear preference for saving the 
young, while regulators have tended to take a broad non-discriminatory approach 
including age.216 
At some point the ethical choices programmed into healthcare AI will also 
require study and popular validation. Some of the questions likely could track the 
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autonomous vehicle Moral Machine questions, e.g., the basic discrimination/non-
discrimination norms. However, other health scenarios seem even more complex 
than the most challenging vehicle questions. For example, as Beatrice Hoffman 
has pointed out, the U.S. healthcare system rations by price, thereby discriminating 
against the poor.217 Healthcare industry stakeholders have few incentives to change 
that model, but should this sad state be allowed to infect healthcare AI? How 
should the AI be programmed when its decisions may impact end-of-life care? 
And, perhaps most challenging, it is at least arguable that AI diagnostics will far 
outperform our present systems; begging the question whether their sensitivity 
should be “turned down” because we lack the healthcare resources to treat all those 
newly diagnosed conditions; potentially a troubling new form of healthcare 
rationing. 
B. Societal Good and Public Goods 
It is an open question whether any U.S. debate over the regulation of 
healthcare AI can be expanded to include societal good and public goods issues. 
Increasingly these questions are being viewed as pivotal by policymakers in 
countries that have also embraced universal access and health equity. There, the 
use of healthcare system data by private parties may suggest stealth privatization. 
However, societal good and public goods arguments are less likely to achieve 
traction in a U.S. system that is built around private healthcare delivery and a 
mixed public-private financing model. 
Although they are alluded to by some of the reports referenced above, the 
moral imperative of societal good and the ownership/excludability question posed 
by public goods deserve highlighting. Frankly, these are less obviously ethical 
questions and, more overtly, political ones. They implicate both the ownership of 
clinical data used to train AI and the data subsequently generated by the AI. The 
UK House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence argued, “The data 
held by the NHS could be considered a unique source of value for the nation. It 
should not be shared lightly, but when it is, it should be done in a manner which 
allows for that value to be recouped.”218 Relatedly the GDPR provides, “The 
processing of personal data should be designed to serve mankind. The right to the 
protection of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be considered in relation 
to its function in society and be balanced against other fundamental rights, in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality.”219 In the U.S. these are starkly 
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challenging questions because, unlike many western industrialized countries,220 the 
U.S. has not embraced the healthcare solidarity that typically underpins such 
discussions about societal good or healthcare data ownership. 
In the private sector, Alphabet, Amazon, and Apple have all indicated an 
interest in closer integration of their technologies with clinical data, much of which 
comes from public sources. For example, Alphabet’s DeepMind has a 
controversial relationship with a UK hospital trust giving it broad access to EHR 
data,221 a relationship that caused additional concerns when Alphabet decided to 
integrate DeepMind into its Google division.222 Amazon has released cloud-based 
software that can parse EHRs to provide data for analytics software.223 Apple is 
reportedly in discussions with the Department of Veterans Affairs to make 
individuals’ records available on Apple devices. Concerns about these public-
private relationships are usually expressed in terms of data protection questions 
(e.g., if Google matched health records to Gmail emails). However, they should 
also be framed as public goods issues, as our clinical data is being used to generate 
private profit. Hetan Shah is correct in arguing that, in addition to transparency and 
other regulatory imperatives, “in the long run it will be the data which is the 
monopoly asset,” and “the public sector should be more confident” in its 
negotiating power with AI companies.224 
In the future AI may become the quintessential public health tool mapping out 
what we need to do to reduce social determinants of health and improve health 
equity.225 Today, however, healthcare stakeholders are more likely to use these 
tools for more pedestrian, revenue-generating purposes such as reducing 
readmissions that otherwise would lead to Medicare readmission penalties or for 
public policy-avoiding, such as data mining to avoid health equity provisions in 
the ACA. Those involved in the highest levels of AI medical research may object 
to this characterization. For example, they might refer to the promise in AI for 
early for cancer diagnosis and personalized treatment. While that is literally true 
of the science, the motivation may be more complicated: cancer is big business, 
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and it creates major profit centers for hospitals226 and drug companies.227 
All may not be doom and gloom. For example, Google includes “Be socially 
beneficial” as the first of its “Objectives for AI applications.”228 It has also 
launched a competition called AI for Social Good, “a global call for nonprofits, 
academics, and social enterprises from around the world to submit proposals on 
how they could use AI to help address some of the world’s greatest social, 
humanitarian and environmental problems.”229 Of course, a more dystopian 
interpretation of Google’s policy can be found in Shoshana Zuboff’s “surveillance 
capitalism” thesis,230 which asserts that private actors will provide free access to 
advanced healthcare in exchange for all our health data that will then be used to 
train the AI and produce profitable predictive products. 
C. AI Regulatory Design Objectives 
Building new regulatory criteria and processes for AI is a serious undertaking. 
For it to be worthwhile, there must be some clear design objectives. This 
framework must also be flexible, because both the benefits and risks of AI involve 
everything from the unforeseen to the unknowable. For example, it is possible that 
AI will accelerate beyond any human capacity to regulate it. The dystopian view 
is that this would mark not only a regulatory endpoint, but also, in the words of 
Nick Bostrom, “a technologically highly advanced society . . . which nevertheless 
lacks any type of being that is conscious or whose welfare has moral 
significance . . . A Disneyland without children.”231 Hopefully well in advance of 
that endpoint, a regulatory agency would either reverse course or allow the AI to 
regulate itself within human-programmed guardrails.232 
At a more mundane level, the future regulation of healthcare AI will be better 
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served by abandoning some of our existing models. Gateways such as “medical 
device” fail to capture the cognitive sweep of healthcare AI, while its processes 
(such as §510(k)’s regulation by predicate) may perpetuate technological analogies 
of declining relevance. Similarly, it is important that we avoid re-using path 
dependent language such as the “practice of medicine” by trying to draw analogies 
to the scope of practice of doctors or nurse practitioners. Regulation should also 
try to avoid binary labelling (safe vs. unsafe) in favor of an explicitly holistic, 
multi-faceted inquiry that includes, for example, quality, safety, data protection, 
transparence, and so on. 
Finally, and largely outside the scope of this article, attention will have to be 
paid to the identity and structure of the regulator. There have already been 
questions raised about whether the FDA could better avoid political pressure if it 
was established as an independent agency outside of HHS.233 Similarly, an 
independent regulatory agency for AI may be the preferable solution. For example, 
Sandra Wachter and colleagues have argued for a “trusted third party” to audit AI 
for compliance with the EU right of explanation or, alternatively, for the creation 
of a regulator “specifically for auditing algorithms, before (certifications) and/or 
after algorithms are being deployed.”234 Of course, we may find ourselves getting 
sidetracked by debates over this “super-regulator” when energy could be better 
directed at improving substantive rules. If a super-regulator ends up being favored, 
then, as with the case of data protection,235 the preferred solution would be to have 
a single AI regulatory agency, not a healthcare-specific one. Use of a single 
regulatory agency would help to avoid regulatory exceptionalism, indeterminacy, 
or arbitrage. 
D. Regulatory Imperatives 
One of the core arguments in this article is that regulatory models that 
separately judge the safety of healthcare (such as by using current FDA “device” 
scrutiny) and police the conduct of medical professionals who interact with 
healthcare AI (as with “the practice of medicine”) are conceptually ill-equipped to 
regulate future AI technologies. This section suggests that the better course is to 
adopt a holistic approach sensitive to how the technological and human domains 
are fundamentally intertwined. The recent EU Commission report on AI ethics 
suggested the following regulatory requirements; “(1) human agency and 
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oversight, (2) technical robustness and safety, (3) privacy and data governance, (4) 
transparency, (5) diversity, non-discrimination and fairness, (6) environmental and 
societal well-being and (7) accountability.”236 
This is a workable list of regulatory priorities. They should be implementable 
in a non-binary fashion and seem well-suited to reflect different tradeoffs in 
diverse products and services (for example, one AI may require heightened safety, 
another high levels of transparency). Although all are interlinked and 
interdependent, clearly several of them (for example, privacy and transparency) 
are even more tightly intertwined. This section does not attempt a comprehensive 
examination of each imperative. Rather, a selection of imperatives is discussed in 
the context of healthcare AI, together with certain additional (or sometimes 
differently labelled or emphasized) suggestions for regulatory focus. 
1. Quality and Safety 
Overall, quality and safety imperatives are well-known and non-contentious. 
In all probability, the safety imperative can be appropriately addressed by 
something akin to the FDA’s risk-based model.237 For example, the agency 
recently published a caution letter warning that notwithstanding reports it had 
received of surgeons using robotically-assisted surgical devices in mastectomy 
procedures, neither the safety nor the effectiveness of those devices for such 
procedures had been established.238 As a result, this section provides only a cursory 
examination of the quality and safety issues posed by healthcare AI. 
In many high-risk domains, automation is either accepted (for example, 
commercial airplanes are flown more by auto-pilot than the flight crew239) or 
eagerly anticipated (for example, using autonomous vehicles to avoid accidents 
caused by driver errors240). Without reiterating all the potential beneficial uses for 
healthcare AI, immediate improvements can be imagined, from physicians being 
relieved of administrative tasks so that they can practice at the top of their licenses, 
to patients being able to self-manage their chronic diseases, to far earlier and more 
accurate diagnoses. 
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The upside of these technologies is offset by two core quality and safety 
concerns. First, AI is, and increasingly will grow, beyond human understanding, 
often resulting in algorithms that are “fully opaque” or “so complex as to defy 
understanding.”241 Second, while robots seem relatively tame when they resemble 
cuddly seals or convenient digital assistants that remind you to refill your 
prescription, their offspring may combine, in the words of Ryan Calo, “the 
generative promiscuity of data with the capacity to do physical harm.”242 
While the similarities between quality and safety issues posed by AI and the 
issues posed by devices that traditionally been submitted to the FDA (or other risk-
based agencies) for approval will not be labored, it is important to highlight some 
of the differences. First, quality and safety will depend not only on hardware and 
software behavior but, increasingly, on the data used to train the AI. According to 
the EU Commission, “Whilst ML is the generic class of algorithms that learn from 
the data, their accuracy depends very much on the quality of the training dataset, 
and how well they have been structured, semantically labelled, and cleaned by 
humans to make them representative of the problem to tackle, and reduce the 
number of parameters in the data.”243 Indeed, as noted by one healthcare AI 
research team, “The quantity and quality of the training set are critically important 
in the development of state-of-the-art deep learning . . . “244 
Second, as the technology advances, the list of unique safety and quality issues 
involving healthcare AI will grow. For example, Robert Challen and colleagues 
have suggested a general framework for cataloging such issues. They identify, 
first, short-term issues such as “distributional shift,” “insensitivity to impact,” 
“black box decision making,” and “unsafe failure mode.” Second, they classify 
medium-term issues as “automation complacency,” “reinforcement of outmoded 
practice,” and “self-fulfilling prediction.” Finally, they label long-term issues such 
as “negative side effects,” “reward hacking,” “unsafe exploration,” and 
“unscalable oversight.”245 This typology may or may not prove to be definitive, 
but it seems inarguable that such risk identification research must proceed apace 
so as to inform healthcare AI design best practices and generate regulatory 
checklists. 
2. Efficacy and Cost-Effectiveness 
In addition to its safety inquiries, the FDA examines a device’s efficacy, that 
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is its effectiveness for a particular use.246 Similarly, the FTC’s scrutiny of device 
representations can include scientific efficacy, in that it can require randomized 
and controlled human clinical trials to substantiate a manufacturer’s marketing 
claims.247 
However, the agencies do not address comparative effectiveness (CER); how 
a device’s effectiveness compares with an existing device or some other clinical 
intervention. Nor are devices subject to cost-effectiveness analysis or 
benchmarking (CEA). In this regard, the U.S. regulatory systems differ from the 
New Technology Assessment used by many other industrialized countries to 
determine, for example, whether a product should be included in a national 
formulary or at what price.248 
At the very least, our conceptions of quality, safety, and data protection should 
reflect CER—and preferably CEA.249 Once again, the debate over autonomous 
vehicles is illustrative. One of the primary arguments in favor of such vehicles is 
that they will eliminate almost all highway fatalities, given that ninety-four per 
cent of serious crashes involve human error. However, a deeper dive into the 
causes of those crashes and the limitations of autonomous vehicles suggest a far 
more modest number of lives will be saved.250 Similar, and even intuitively 
accurate, claims are likely are likely to be made about the safety of healthcare AI, 
suggesting we will need robust data to help us make regulatory decisions. 
Although exact timelines remain murky it seems likely that AI will have an 
enormous impact on our healthcare system, including physical (workforce) and 
intellectual (analysis including diagnostics) substitutions. Given how this will 
change investment priorities for both public and private bodies, the likely 
reinvestment of private and public moneys, and the general economic dislocation 
that is likely, benchmarking tools such as CER and CEA should have great 
salience. They should be applied on both a macro and micro basis, critically 
analyzing both industry-wide and device-to-device substitutions. In the case of the 
former, AI and robots are heralded as capable of automating drudgery and, as 
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Kevin Kelly notes, many of these are “jobs we could never do.”251 However, one 
person’s drudgery is another’s limited employment opportunity. Healthcare is a 
leading economic engine in the U.S., with healthcare jobs growing at around seven 
times the rate of the non-healthcare economy.252 Although some of these jobs are 
for professionally-trained clinicians, the vast majority are for lower-skill 
administrators and hospital or home-based caregivers.253 If these are supplanted by 
AI or robots, the negative impact on the healthcare economy will be substantial .254 
Not surprisingly there have been proposals to use taxes to create funds for the 
re-education of economically exiled humans.255 Thus, Microsoft co-founder Bill 
Gates has argued, that in certain cases taxes should be used to slow down the speed 
of automation while policymakers “manage that displacement.”256 Here, too, 
robust CER and CEA data should be able to guide policymakers in making any 
such decisions. For example, new technologies that make only marginal 
contributions yet have large displacing impact might be taxed more than a highly 
innovative AI that is similarly displacing but which substantially reduces 
healthcare costs. 
3. A Modern Data Protection Construct 
Data protection and freedom from surveillance parallel the question of societal 
good. They are issues that involve both individual and societal questions of great 
import. Again, these issues display considerable maturity in Europe, as evidenced 
by the recently implemented EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).257 
In contrast, the debate about stronger data protection in the U.S. is nascent. 
However, a heavily modernized data protection construct is a sine qua non for 
trusted implementation of healthcare AI. 
As noted above, the weaknesses of current U.S. data protection are its sectoral 
approach, outdated and primarily downstream data protection models, and the 
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proliferation of domain-specific regulators. In general, healthcare data custodians 
that are not HIPAA covered entities or their business associates are regulated only 
lightly. While the data used to train AI and the data generated by AI are healthcare 
data, it is less likely that the data custodians or processors (e.g., app and wearable 
developers or large AI companies) will be HIPAA covered entities or even 
business associates. First, the data may be supplied by the data subjects themselves 
not their providers (as would be the case with many wearables). Second, the data 
may originate outside of the conventional healthcare such as when data brokers 
collect medically inflected data.258 Third, even where AI companies enter into 
direct relationships with healthcare entities, they may avoid HIPAA regulation by 
collecting only deidentified data,259 even though such companies are likely the best 
situated technologically to reidentify the data though triangulation.260 
Currently, regulators are likely to show interest in data protection if data 
custodians adopt flagrantly poor security practices or fail to comply with their own 
privacy policies. As a matter of practice, these lightly regulated businesses have 
adopted a notice and consent (or choice) model of privacy “protection.” Scholars 
such as Robert Sloan and Richard Warner have critiqued notice and consent as 
“neither free nor informed consent; nor does it yield an acceptable tradeoff.”261 
Further, the manner in which data brokers acquire healthcare data, typically 
indirectly and not from the data subject,262 renders any notice and consent process 
illusory. As Michael Froomkin argues, albeit in the context of human subject 
research, “Big Data kills the possibility of true informed consent because by its 
very nature one purpose of big data analytics is to find unexpected patterns in 
data.”263 This point is only amplified by the application of AI/ML to those data; 
not only will unexpected patterns be found but the AI may generate “new” 
unanticipated data such as when the AI uses probabilistic techniques such as 
Gaussian Processes.264 
Newly emerged technologies such as app platforms, data analytics, and the 
Internet of Things265 offer unprecedented challenges to the privacy and security of 
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data and the uses to which it is put. For example, location services used for tasks 
such as navigation or, in the health space, fitness tracking provide the opportunity 
for massive amounts of unconsented-to surveillance.266 The emerging technologies 
discussed here provide more opportunities for the collection of sensitive data of 
data collection (healthcare robots) and immeasurably more powerful insights, 
including reidentification, from collected data (AI). Similar to mobile medical 
apps, AI and robots that are not tied to a HIPAA entity face little or no regulation 
as to how they should share data with third parties or the level of security they 
should provide.267 
Apple CEO Tim Cook has warned, “Our own information — from the 
everyday to the deeply personal — is being weaponized against us with military 
efficiency.”268 The recent EU Guidance on AI ethics expressed considerable 
concern about the potential of AI to provide public and private entities with more 
efficient ways to identify individuals without their consent.269 Other recognized 
threats include widespread surveillance, datafication or commoditization of 
persons, and more micro concerns such as undermining ACA protections against 
medical underwriting with big data facilitated drug tiering, or, more indirectly, the 
use of health scores by employers to make their workforce more attractive to health 
insurers. 
AI and robots are also “always on.” AI requires a constant feed of input data 
to process though its trained algorithms, while a caregiver robot’s sensors 
(cameras, face recognition, voice recognition, radar, lidar, proximity, 
accelerometer, moisture, etc.) will continually process environmental and patient 
data. There are already concerns about the surveillance risks of “always on” 
personal digital assistants such as Amazon’s Echo and Google Home.270 The risks 
associated with AI and robots are at a completely different level. They are more 
akin to the facial and gait recognition employed in countries with high-level 
surveillance.271 
Two questions are particularly pertinent in understanding the role of data 
protection in the regulation of AI: first, a procedural question as to the extent the 
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data protection scrutiny of AI, which will be separate from the other regulatory 
criteria examined herein; and second, a substantive question as to the protective 
models that should be adopted. 
As to the first question, it would be possible to embed an AI-specific data 
protection model into newly imagined AI regulatory systems. Such a model could 
encourage domain expertise in examining AI data protection questions. Equally, 
however, a data protection model operating outside of a general data protection 
regulatory system could encourage exceptionalism and fragmentation. A better 
response would be for the AI regulator to require compliance with general data 
protection rules. This model is consistent with the arguments advanced above for 
a single AI regulator.272 
Second, that general data protection regime must include substantive rights 
and regulatory processes that offer a significant upgrade over the existing 
regulatory landscape. Specifically, the protection of both individual and societal 
interests from surveillance and datafication requires a modern, non-domain 
specific system that uses multiple protective models embodying Fair Information 
Practice Principles (FIPPs).273 In the words of a recent Washington Post editorial, 
“It is time for something new. Legislators must establish expectations of 
companies that go beyond advising consumers that they will be exploiting their 
personal information . . . The burden no longer should rest with the user to avoid 
getting stepped on by a giant. Instead, the giants should have to watch where 
they’re walking.”274 While Congress and technology companies seem to edging 
towards a federal privacy law they can both live with,275 privacy advocates are 
increasingly concerned that any federal legislation will be relatively weak and 
primarily directed at preempting more robust, emerging state laws.276 
Detailing such a model for the U.S. is outside the scope of this article. 
However, data reformers view the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
as the regulatory exemplar. The GDPR defines “data concerning health” as the 
“personal data related to the physical or mental health of a natural person, 
including the provision of healthcare services, which reveal information about his 
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or her health status.”277 Its FIPPS-inspired protections include accountability, 
transparency, purpose and time limitations, and data minimization.278 Arguably, 
these requirements are antithetical to the training of AI, its black box algorithms, 
and the business models of AI and Big Data companies.279 However, emerging 
privacy-respecting technologies, including federated learning, differential privacy, 
and homomorphic encryption, are capable of keeping many of the benefits of AI 
while protecting the subjects of the underlying data.280 
Those looking for a U.S. model for improved data protection are paying 
considerable attention to California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.281 The 
statute primarily relies on a transparency model requiring data custodians to 
disclose what information they hold about a data subject and whether it is being 
sold or otherwise disclosed. The data subject can stop the sale of the information 
and cannot be discriminated against in service or if they exercise their rights. 
Unfortunately, the statute has some domain carveouts for HIPAA entities and 
human subjects research data that preserve exceptionalism282 
4. Social Cues, Form, Social Valence, and Empathy 
Historically, effective communication has been promoted as the epicenter of 
the physician-patient relationship283 It has also been considered the key to building 
empathy and trust. Although his context was different, Carlos Pellegrini’s words 
capture the difficulty of “preserv[ing] the interpersonal relationship with our 
patients in an environment that is driven by business, standardization, and large 
systems of care that focus on population health rather than individual patients.”284 
An extreme but educative example of the downside of advanced healthcare 
technologies is a recent report that a doctor at a remote location used a telerobot to 
tell a patient and his family of his impending death.285 
Communication, empathy and trust are not just about making the healthcare 
experience a more tolerable, patient-centered one that is attuned to vulnerabilities. 
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Attentiveness and appreciation of patient circumstances and needs can lead to 
improved diagnostic insights.286 To what extent are these ethical and instrumental 
qualities to be expected of healthcare AI and appropriate to consider as regulatory 
imperatives? 
In the short-term, humans are likely to perform a translational role, with 
clinicians injecting their own communication skills, empathy, and compassion to 
smooth over the rough spots in the patient-AI interaction. In some cases, form may 
serve as a surrogate for compassion. For example, the first generations of caregiver 
or companion robots have been designed either as humanoid287 or representative 
of some other form that engenders a positive social cue, such as cuddly toy288 or a 
puppy.289 Further into the future, questions may arise as to whether the physical 
form (or future AI holographic representations290) of the AI or other social cues 
will require regulation. Today we know that physical cues such as the gender of a 
nurse plays into stereotyping, such that male nurses may be viewed as less capable 
of providing intimate and sensitive care.291 Some of these questions may become 
intertwined with decisions about which AI should be vested with humanlike rights 
and duties. As Cofone argues those decisions likely will be derived from a 
framework of relative embodiment, emergence, and social valence.292 The 
subjectivity inherent in these, particularly social valence, suggests broadly 
acceptable decisions will evolve quite slowly. 
Beyond communication and social cues, empathy and other behavioral, 
psychological, and psychosocial aspects of healthcare interactions can affect trust, 
autonomy, and compassion.293 The question arises, therefore, of whether we will 
regulate how AI relates to those it cares for. Empathy can be viewed as a 
touchstone for predicting substitution.294 For example, it is often suggested that 
empathetic jobs, including counsellors or medical disciplines such as psychiatry, 
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will be least likely to face substitution.295 However, an orthogonal question exists 
as to the extent to which healthcare AI and robots can or should be empathetic with 
their patients. 
Healthcare information technologies have created interpersonal wedges 
between clinicians and their patients. Examples include the alert fatigue caused by 
EHR and CDS pop-up warnings296 and the tendency of physicians to concentrate 
more on a computer interface than the patient in the same examination room.297 As 
suggested above, AI natural language processing and other digital assistants should 
take over note-taking and allow the physician to concentrate on the patient rather 
than the technology.298 However, in some cases AI could take technological 
intrusion to the other extreme such that the only “persons” in the room will be the 
patient and a robot. For some, this will prove unacceptable. Michael Mittelman and 
colleagues argue that “[p]atients need to be cared for by people, especially when 
we are ill and at our most vulnerable. A machine will never be able to show us true 
comfort. The ability to understand fully the ‘human condition’ will always be 
essential to health management.”299 Empathy may well be too important a property 
in the diagnostic, treatment, and recovery processes to abandon. To stretch an 
analogy, “[r]obots that can grill meat, slice tomatoes, stir fry vegetables and even 
stretch pizza dough are making fast food even faster, but would you trust a chef 
who has never tasted the food it creates?”300 
Empathy goes beyond a caring imperative to a protective one. According to 
Pelligrini, “[i]t is important to consider our patients’ vulnerability in the 
relationship. For physicians to fulfill their commitment to trust, they must protect, 
rather than exploit, this vulnerability.”301 As we design and regulate healthcare AI, 
we have to address the extent we believe they should be subject to ethical rules and 
to an extent be infused with human values. 
This is both a technical question--whether our caregiver and other healthcare 
technologies can be effectively programmed to approximate the empathetic 
needs/expectation of patients—and a normative one. Do we want our technologies 
to “fake it”?302 The analogy once again can be drawn to hybrid and pure electric 
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automobiles. The quietness of the driving experience has led some manufacturers 
to create artificial engine noise that is piped into the cabin.303 However, automobile 
noise is more than a matter of taste. From September 2020 hybrid and electric 
vehicles sold in the U.S. face minimum sound requirements during low-speed 
operation to alert pedestrians (particularly blind ones) and bicyclists to the 
presence of such vehicles.304 A similar rule is being implemented in the EU.305 
Increasingly, AI personal assistants are being tuned to better understand the 
context of their interactions with humans. In part, this is achieved by analyzing 
non-verbal sounds rather than just concentrating on the parsing of language.306 
Current products are beginning to introduce rudimentary examples; Amazon 
Alexa’s has a new “whisper mode” that understands that its instructions are being 
whispered (perhaps in the presence of a sleeping baby) and so will whisper back.307 
As these technologies evolve, there may be questions about imposing limits on 
artificial empathy, a question of particular relevance to caregiver bots or even end-
of-life comfort bots.308 
A related issue is whether, as AI gets closer to passing the Turing test,309 it 
should announce its own non-obvious artificiality. For example, Google Duplex is 
a neural network AI that uses natural speech to make completely human-sounding 
“natural conversations” phone calls to persons (for example, a call requesting a 
restaurant reservation).310 When the technology was first demonstrated to the press, 
questions were raised as to whether the technology was deceptive in not 
announcing itself as a ‘bot.311 Subsequently, questions were raised about its data-
gathering role.312 These issues will be of particular consequence in the healthcare 
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setting as, for example, the algorithms in diagnostic chat bots analyze both speech 
and speech patterns to recognize depression.313 The recent EU Guidance on 
trustworthy AI argues that “]AI systems should not represent themselves as 
humans to users; humans have the right to be informed that they are interacting 
with an AI system..”314 
5. Eliminating Discrimination, Promoting Health Equity, and Transparency 
Perhaps more than any of the other regulatory imperatives discussed herein 
the intertwined requirements of eliminating discrimination, promoting health 
equity, and transparency represent the battle for the “soul” of healthcare AI: 
whether it can trusted and its commitment to beneficence. 
Discrimination by healthcare AI is particularly troubling because the 
healthcare system itself still struggles with implicit bias.315 That state was in part a 
motivating factor for the inclusion of the healthcare nondiscrimination provision 
in the ACA.316 Layering healthcare AI on top of the system multiplies such 
problems because of bias amplification caused by unrepresentative datasets used 
for training,317 such as melanoma images primarily captured from persons with 
light colored skin.318 As is well-known, AI software has been shown to be capable 
of gender319 and race320 biases, and these biases are likely to perpetuate stereotypes. 
AI and big data are particularly adept at population segmentation. This could 
have important positive effects if, for example, the AI is used to direct services to 
where they are most needed with the goal of increasing population health321 or 
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delivering precise or personalized healthcare.322 However, such segmentation 
could be used for “technological redlining,”323 impacting access to care (for 
example, by denying healthcare insurance to the sick or imposing higher premiums 
or tiering drugs on the basis of diseases associated with sexual preference, age, or 
ethnicity).324 In such latter scenarios, AI would transgress the principle of 
healthcare solidarity that is the foundation of inclusive healthcare systems.325 
Like other health information technologies, healthcare AI is projected to 
improve access, reduce cost, and improve quality. The health equality (non-
discrimination) question is whether those improvements will accrue to all or only 
a section of the population. The health equity question is broader, asking whether 
we can reduce not just health disparities but also their determinants.326 According 
to Andy Slavitt, a CMS administrator under president Obama who is now leading 
a venture capital firm, “We need to stop investing in the third Fitbit for the 50-
year-old upper-class person and start innovating for people who have common 
diseases and conditions, but live in communities with low access to care.”327 
In addition to decisions made by public and private payors in setting their 
reimbursement policies, the health equity question may play out in product and 
service marketing. For example, will healthcare AI be positioned as a premium 
service like today’s healthcare concierge models?328 Or will things resolve in the 
opposite direction, with AI established as a low-cost alternative healthcare system 
for the many, while the few will receive their healthcare from “real” doctors? 
Whatever the direction, a fundamental inquiry must be whether healthcare AI will 
increase or decrease healthcare disparities. An obvious example is the caregiver 
robot. With our declining birthrate, a still robust life expectancy notwithstanding 
the rampant “diseases of despair,”329 and nativist-inspired controls on immigration, 
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who will take care of our aging population? In other words, will we have affordable 
caregiver robots at scale? If we continue to struggle politically and economically, 
the question of universal healthcare becomes whether AI can positively intervene, 
following the example of Google’s Cityblock subsidiary that creates community-
based clinics (“Neighborhood Hubs”) in underserved urban areas.330 Or, as 
Nicholson Price argues, are ideas of AI-powered, democratized medical expertise 
doomed because of the “disconnect between high-resource training environments 
and low-resource deployment environments will likely result in predictable 
decreases in the quality of algorithmic recommendations for care, limiting the 
promise of medical AI to actually democratize excellence.”331 
Transparency has a least two meanings in the context of healthcare AI. The 
first is transparency in governance, and this meaning intersects with some of the 
data protection and regulator discussions above. The second meaning is a question 
of technological transparency: if we do not understand how healthcare AI makes 
decisions, how can we assess whether a clinician should rely on the technologies 
(or rely on his or her professional training and ignore the technologies)? AI 
opaqueness also dramatically amplifies the difficulty of identifying and curing 
implicit bias. 
Jay Katz ended his Silent World exposé with the argument that “both 
[physician and patient] must be trusted, but that they can only be trusted if they 
first learn to trust each other.”332 Katz “only” had to confront informational 
asymmetry and a deficiency in physician communication built on paternalism. 
Healthcare AI poses questions of a completely different order of difficulty, the 
most obvious being that if, through the beneficence of its programmers, the AI 
decided to break its silence, it is wholly unclear whether it could or would say 
anything remotely comprehensible to its patient or even a nearby physician. 
The preferred solution, and so a regulatory imperative, is algorithmic 
accountability.333 According to the recent EU Guidance on AI ethics, “a fully 
transparent procedure should be made available to citizens, including information 
on the process, purpose and methodology of the scoring… Ideally the possibility 
of opting out of the scoring mechanism when possible without detriment should 
be provided – otherwise mechanisms for challenging and rectifying the scores must 
be given..”334 
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Consider, for example, “Deep Patient,” an AI project at Mount Sinai Hospital 
where the AI was given access to 700,000 patient records and then tasked with 
assessing the charts of new patients. It turned out that the system was “incredibly 
good at predicting disease.”335 But what if it had been a failure? Would 
stakeholders including providers and patients have been able to question it to learn 
about its errors? Equally, how can a patient make an informed decision about 
proffered healthcare without understanding, even in very general terms, how the 
decision about his or her health is being made? The “transparency” answer to these 
questions is that we should be able to interrogate decision-making algorithms. 
Subsumed in that question is a more practical dichotomy: to trust the technology 
or abandon it.336 
A related transparency issue, more akin to conflicts of interest, concerns the 
bilateral data relationships that arise between analytics/AI service providers and 
data custodians. A primary example would be the relationship between Google’s 
DeepMind and the NHS Royal Free in the UK.337 Another is when an AI-based 
employee recruitment company also supplies human resource software that 
uploads employee data to the recruitment company.338 Technologically, this is how 
it should work, using a feedback loop to continually improve the data and sharpen 
the algorithm. However, while those feedback loops may benefit both the employer 
and the recruitment company or the UK trust and Google, they may not be such a 
clear win for the data subjects. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Examination of the normative expectations for and regulatory models 
applicable to healthcare AI are in their infancy. Some readers may take comfort 
from the traditionally lagged adoption of technology exhibited by healthcare—
maybe other industries will have to address the issues sooner, with policymakers 
coming up with properly calibrated regulation. However, superior results may be 
delivered if healthcare stakeholders are at that regulatory table and contribute to 
the dialog. 
These issues are fundamental to the future of healthcare and population health 
and will inform the next several generations of questions about healthcare access, 
quality, and cost containment. At the very least, any regulatory model must be 
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expansive and multi-faceted and not dependent on narrow technocratic evaluation 
of device safety or physician licensure. 
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